

B

1652

.A5

1910





PASSAGES FROM THE PHILOSOPHY
OF HERBERT SPENCER

*750 copies of this book have been
printed on Van Gelder hand-made
paper and the type distributed.*

PASSAGES FROM THE PHILOSOPHY
OF HERBERT SPENCER CHOSEN
BY CLARA SHERWOOD STEVENS




PRINTED FOR THOMAS B MOSHER AND
PUBLISHED BY HIM AT XLV EXCHANGE
STREET PORTLAND MAINE MDCCCCX

B1652
.A5
1910

COPYRIGHT
CLARA SHERWOOD STEVENS
1910

©CL A271498



CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE	xi
I FIRST PRINCIPLES	3
II PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY	29
III PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY	39
IV PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY	45
V PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS	59
VI MISCELLANEOUS WORKS	79

PREFACE

The writer is indebted to the courtesy of Messrs. D. Appleton & Company for permission to publish these passages and it is to their excellent new edition of Herbert Spencer's complete works that the page citations refer.

C. S. S.



PREFACE

THE *energies of our system will decay, the glory of the sun will be dimmed, and the earth, tideless and inert, will no longer tolerate the race which has for a moment disturbed its solitude. Man will go down into the pit, and all his thoughts will perish. The uneasy consciousness, which in this obscure corner has for a brief space broken the contented silence of the universe, will be at rest. Matter will know itself no longer. ‘Imperishable monuments’ and ‘Immortal Deeds,’ death itself, and love stronger than death will be as though they had never been. Nor will anything that is better or be worse for all that the labour, genius, devotion and suffering of man have striven through countless generations to effect.”*

Perhaps to the average reader these lines from *The Foundations of Belief*, by Arthur James Balfour, would seem to characterize the doctrine of Herbert Spencer. But the real student of his Philosophy would resent the injustice of such an interpretation. As though from a glance at a figure upon the border of an intricate piece of tapestry, one could conceive the design and colour scheme of the whole.

Herbert Spencer could not avoid the conviction that there exists no rational foundation for the belief in the continuance of conscious personality after death. He believed that the human intellect in its present state of development, could offer no solution to the great problem of identity. He neither affirmed nor denied but with unremitting labour and his life's devotion he produced a Philosophy which gave an inestimable impulse to modern thought if not to Science. In his *Synthetic Philosophy* he revealed the mysterious unity of all existence ; — he traced the progress of Evolution in life, mind, society and morality.

As one follows the deep probing of his thought into the realms of the unseen and the inscrutable

one travels beyond the personal — the here and the now — and thinks in terms of the Universe. For a time, at least, the sense of *self* fades into insignificance. The wistful wonder as to what, in all this development, is to become of *us*, is for a little while forgotten. All attempt to assert what we are in the innermost recesses of our being seems futile arrogance, and we stand humbly with bared heads, in the Presence — the Omnipresence of the Great Unknown.

Far from being against Religion his desire was rather to strengthen Religion by bringing it into harmony with Science. He says of established forms of religion, “During each stage of progress men must think in such terms of thought as they possess.” And again he realizes the necessity of the belief in future rewards and punishments to the great mass of men who are not yet capable of tracing “the good and bad consequences which conduct brings round through the established order of things.” But Evolution — Progress, was his cry.

“All parts away for the progress of souls,” Walt Whitman sang as though he had listened and

caught the key from the vibrating bass notes of Spencer's thought.

"All religion, all solid things, art, governments — all that was or is apparent upon this globe or any globe, falls into niches and corners before the procession of souls along the grand roads of the universe.

.
They go! they go! I know that they go, but I know not where they go,
But I know that they go toward the best — toward something great."

But Spencer had not Whitman's poetic vision of immortality — of a *personal* existence forever and forever.— Still one has only to read his "Ultimate Questions" (which is given almost in full at the end of this volume) to discover that in the twilight of his long life of intellectual labour, he too was confronted by the great Riddle — that he too had his longings for something — afterwards — for which he could find no evidence — and that at last he was obliged to content himself with his masterful thought about Space — "that universal matrix itself anteceding alike creation and evolution."

“Theist and Agnostic must agree in recognizing the properties of Space as inherent—eternal—uncreated—as anteceding all creation if creation has taken place and all evolution if evolution has taken place.” And his closing words echo with loneliness and pathos, “Of late years the consciousness that without origin or cause Infinite Space has ever existed and must ever exist, produces in me a feeling from which I shrink.”

The eighteen volumes of Herbert Spencer present such a formidable mass to the average reader that there would seem to be some reason for a little book of selections from his mighty work. An outline of his chain of thought, to give, as it were, a bird's-eye view of his *Synthetic Philosophy* by placing in orderly succession the statements that spring most forcibly from his pages.

As the task of selection went on it became more and more apparent to what an extraordinary extent modern thought is influenced if not moulded by his philosophy.

Our generation is so quick to seize a new thought that we often forget to whom we are indebted for it. Our system of telegraph and cable has given

a kind of consciousness to the world—a consciousness which eagerly absorbs every new fragment of the knowledge acquired with so much patience and self-denial by the discoverer. Our world absorbs and gives out again until the *thought* so timidly advanced but a few years ago becomes as a household word whilst the name of the thinker is all but forgotten. The axioms of to-morrow were yesterday but dreams. The thought of the individual becomes the thought of the world.

Though it is unlikely that the name of Herbert Spencer will ever be forgotten, one can but doubt whether, in these overloaded days, many have the time and the eyes, even if they have the desire, to read enough of his philosophy to understand and appreciate him. And from such a doubt grew the determination to offer these passages both to those who do not know, and to those who do know and reverence the work of this most profound thinker of modern times.

CLARA SHERWOOD STEVENS.



I
FIRST PRINCIPLES

FIRST
PRINCIPLES

Of all antagonisms of belief the oldest, the widest, the most profound, and the most important, is that between Religion and Science. (p. 9.)

The universality of religious ideas, their independent evolution among different primitive races, and their great vitality, unite in showing that their source must be deep-seated. In other words, we are obliged to admit that if not supernaturally derived as the majority contend, they must be derived out of human experiences, slowly accumulated and organized. (p. 11.)

If the religious sentiment, displayed constantly by the majority of mankind, and occasionally aroused even in those seemingly devoid of it, must be classed among human emotions, we cannot rationally ignore it. Here is an attribute which has played a conspicuous part throughout the entire past as far back as history records, and is at present the life of numerous institutions, the stimulus to perpetual controversies, and the prompter of countless daily actions. Evidently as a question in philosophy, we are called on to say what this attribute means; and we cannot decline the task without confessing our philosophy to be incompetent. (pp. 11, 12.)

Positive knowledge does not, and never can, fill the whole region of possible thought. At the uttermost reach

of discovery there arises, and must ever arise, the question — What lies beyond? (p. 13.)

FIRST
PRINCIPLES

Throughout all future time, as now, the human mind may occupy itself, not only with ascertained phenomena and their relations, but also with that unascertained something which phenomena and their relations imply. Hence if knowledge cannot monopolize consciousness — if it must always continue possible for the mind to dwell upon that which transcends knowledge, then there can never cease to be a place for something of the nature of Religion; since Religion under all its forms is distinguished from everything else in this, that its subject matter passes the sphere of the intellect. (p. 13.)

Science is simply a higher development of common knowledge; and if Science is repudiated, all knowledge must be repudiated along with it. (p. 14.)

Nowhere is it possible to draw a line and say — here Science begins. (p. 15.)

Religion, everywhere present as a warp running through the weft of human history, expresses some eternal fact; while Science is an organized body of truths, ever growing, and ever being purified from errors. And if both have bases in the reality of things, then between them there must be a fundamental harmony. (p. 16.)

FIRST
PRINCIPLES

We have to discover some fundamental verity which Religion will assert, with all possible emphasis, in the absence of Science; and which Science, with all possible emphasis, will assert in the absence of Religion. We must look for a conception which combines the conclusions of both—must see how Science and Religion express opposite sides of the same fact: the one its near or visible side, and the other its remote or invisible side. (p. 17.)

When we inquire what is the meaning of the effects produced on our senses—when we ask how there come to be in our consciousness impressions of sounds, of colours, of tastes, and of those various attributes we ascribe to bodies, we are compelled to regard them as the effects of some cause. (p. 30.)

We are obliged not only to suppose some cause, but also a first cause. The matter, or spirit, or other agent producing these impressions on us, must either be the first cause of them or not. If it is the first cause the conclusion is reached. If it is not the first cause, then by implication there must be a cause behind it, which thus becomes the real cause of the effect. (p. 31.)

If beyond that finite region over which the First Cause extends, there lies a region, which we are compelled to

regard as infinite, over which it does not extend — if we admit that there is an infinite uncaused surrounding the finite caused ; we tacitly abandon the hypothesis of causation altogether. Thus it is impossible to consider the First Cause as finite. But if it cannot be finite it must be infinite. (p. 31.)

FIRST
PRINCIPLES

Religions diametrically opposed in their overt dogmas, are perfectly at one in the tacit conviction that the existence of the world with all it contains and all which surrounds it, is a mystery calling for interpretation. (p. 37.)

Alike in the external and the internal worlds, the man of science sees himself in the midst of perpetual changes of which he can discover neither the beginning nor the end. If he allows himself to entertain the hypothesis that the Universe originally existed in a diffused form, he finds it impossible to conceive how this came to be so ; and equally, if he speculates on the future, he can assign no limit to the grand succession of phenomena ever unfolding themselves before him. In like manner if he looks inward he perceives that both ends of the thread of consciousness are beyond his grasp. . . . Objective and subjective things he thus ascertains to be alike inscrutable in their substance and genesis. In all directions his investigations eventually bring him [face to face with an

FIRST
PRINCIPLES

insoluble enigma. . . . He learns at once the greatness and the littleness of the human intellect — its power in dealing with all that comes within the range of experience, its impotence in dealing with all that transcends experience. He, more than any other, truly *knows* that in its ultimate nature nothing can be known. (pp. 55, 56.)

Ultimate religious ideas and ultimate scientific ideas, alike turn out to be merely symbols of the actual, not cognitions of it. (p. 57.)

A thought involves *relation, difference, likeness*. Whatever does not present each of these does not admit of cognition. (p. 68.)

Passing over its noumenal nature of which we know nothing, Life is definable as the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations. (p. 70.)

What we call *truth*, guiding us to successful action and consequent maintenance of life, is simply the accurate correspondence of subjective to objective relations ; while *error*, leading to failure and therefore towards death, is the absence of such accurate correspondence. (pp. 71, 72.)

Deep down then in the very nature of Life, the relativity of our knowledge is discernible. The analysis of vital actions in general, leads not only to the conclusion that

things in themselves cannot be known to us, but also to the conclusion that knowledge of them, were it possible, would be useless. (p. 73.)

FIRST
PRINCIPLES

Besides that *definite* consciousness of which Logic formulates the laws, there is also an *indefinite* consciousness which cannot be formulated. Besides complete thoughts . . . there are thoughts which it is impossible to complete, and yet which are still real, in the sense that they are normal affections of the intellect. (p. 74.)

To say that we cannot know the Absolute, is, by implication, to affirm that there *is* an Absolute. In the very denial of our power to learn *what* the Absolute is, there lies hidden the assumption *that* it is. (p. 74.)

It is impossible to conceive that our knowledge is a knowledge of Appearances only, without at the same time assuming a Reality of which they are appearances; for appearance without reality is unthinkable. (p. 74.)

One of the arguments used to prove the relativity of our knowledge, is, that we cannot conceive Space or Time as either limited or unlimited. (p. 79.)

In the very assertion that all knowledge, properly so called, is Relative, there is involved the assertion that

FIRST
PRINCIPLES

there exists a Non-relative. In each step of the argument by which this doctrine is established, the same assumption is made. From the necessity of thinking in relations, it follows that the Relative is itself inconceivable, except as related to a real Non-relative. Unless a real Non-relative or Absolute be postulated, the Relative itself becomes absolute, and so brings the argument to a contradiction. And on watching our thoughts we have seen how impossible it is to get rid of the consciousness of an Actuality lying behind Appearances; and how, from this impossibility, results our indestructible belief in that Actuality. (pp. 82, 83.)

Here, then, is that basis of agreement we set out to seek. This conclusion which objective science illustrates and subjective science shows to be unavoidable,—this conclusion which brings the results of speculation into harmony with those of common sense; is also the conclusion which reconciles Religion with Science. Common Sense asserts the existence of a reality; Objective Science proves that this reality cannot be what we think it; Subjective Science shows why we cannot think of it as it is, and yet are compelled to think of it as existing; and in this assertion of a Reality utterly inscrutable in nature, Religion finds an assertion essentially coinciding with her own. (p. 84.)

This consciousness of an Incomprehensible Power, called Omnipresent from inability to assign its limits, is just that consciousness on which Religion dwells. (p. 85.)

FIRST
PRINCIPLES

How truly its central position *is* impregnable, Religion has never adequately realized. In the devoutest faith as we commonly see it, there lies hidden a core of scepticism; and it is this scepticism which causes that dread of inquiry shown by Religion when face to face with Science. Obligated to abandon one by one the superstitions it once tenaciously held, and daily finding other cherished beliefs more and more shaken, Religion secretly fears that all things may some day be explained; and thus itself betrays a lurking doubt whether that Incomprehensible Cause of which it is conscious, is really incomprehensible. (pp. 86, 87.)

Of Religion then, we must always remember, that amid its many errors and corruptions it has asserted and diffused a supreme verity. From the first, the recognition of this supreme verity, in however imperfect a manner, has been its vital element. (p. 87.)

Volumes might be written upon the impiety of the pious. (p. 94.)

Meanwhile let us recognize whatever of permanent good there is in these persistent attempts to frame con-

FIRST
PRINCIPLES

ceptions of that which cannot be conceived. From the beginning it has been only through the successive failures of such conceptions to satisfy the mind, that higher and higher ones have been gradually reached ; and doubtless, the conceptions now current are indispensable as transitional modes of thought. . . It is possible, nay probable, that under their most abstract forms, ideas of this order will always continue to occupy the background of our consciousness. Very likely there will ever remain a need to give shape to that indefinite sense of an Ultimate Existence, which forms the basis of our intelligence. (pp. 96, 97.)

Perpetually to construct ideas requiring the utmost stretch of our faculties, and perpetually to find that such ideas must be abandoned as futile imaginations, may realize to us more fully than any other course, the greatness of that which we vainly strive to grasp. (p. 97.)

Doubtless, in all times and places, it has consoled the barbarian to think of his deities as so like himself in nature, that they might be bribed by offerings of food ; and the assurance that deities could not be so propitiated must have been repugnant, because it deprived him of an easy method of gaining supernatural protection. (p. 98.)

No mental revolution can be accomplished without more or less laceration. (p. 98.)

FIRST
PRINCIPLES

Speaking generally, the religion current in each age and among each people, has been as near an approximation to the truth as it was then and there possible for men to receive. (p. 99.)

During each stage of progress men must think in such terms of thought as they possess. (p. 99.)

Even now, for the great mass of men, unable to trace out with clearness those good and bad consequences which conduct brings round through the established order of things, it is well that there should be depicted future punishments and future joys. (p. 101.)

To see clearly how a right or wrong act generates consequences, internal and external, that go on branching out more widely as years progress, requires a rare power of analysis. (p. 101.)

Even as it is, those who relinquish the faith in which they have been brought up, for this most abstract faith in which Science and Religion unite, may not uncommonly fail to act up to their convictions. (pp. 101, 102.)

Forms of religion, like forms of government, must be fit for those who live under them. (p. 102.)

It is hard to bear the display of that pride of ignorance which so far exceeds the pride of science. (p. 103.)

FIRST
PRINCIPLES

Whoever hesitates to utter that which he thinks the highest truth, lest it should be too much in advance of the time, may reassure himself by looking at his acts from an impersonal point of view. Let him remember that opinion is the agency through which character adapts external arrangements to itself, and that his opinion rightly forms part of this agency — is a unit of force constituting, with other such units, the general power which works out social changes; and he will perceive that he may properly give utterance to his innermost conviction: leaving it to produce what effect it may. It is not for nothing that he has in him these sympathies with some principles and repugnance to others. He, with all his capacities, and aspirations, and beliefs, is not an accident but a product of the time. While he is a descendant of the past he is a parent of the future; and his thoughts are as children born to him, which he may not carelessly let die. . . . The highest truth he sees he will fearlessly utter; knowing that, let what may come of it, he is thus playing his right part in the world — knowing that if he can effect the change he aims at — well; if not — well also; though not *so* well. (pp. 105, 106.)

Knowledge of the lowest kind is *un-unified* knowledge; Science is *partially-unified* knowledge; Philosophy is *completely-unified* knowledge. (p. 119.)

Every thought involves a whole system of thoughts, and ceases to exist if severed from its various correlatives. (p. 121.)

We know nothing more of existence than continued manifestation. (p. 126.)

Setting out from the conclusion lately reached, that all things known to us are manifestations of the Unknowable; . . . we find that the manifestations, considered simply as such, are divisible into two great classes, called by some *impressions* and *ideas*. (pp. 127, 128.)

All manifestations of the Unknowable are divisible into two such classes. . . Obviously it corresponds to the division between *object* and *subject*. This profoundest distinction among manifestations of the Unknowable, we recognize by grouping them into *self* and *not-self*. . . Each order of manifestations carries with it the irresistible implication of some power that manifests itself; and by the words *ego* and *non-ego* respectively, we mean the power that manifests itself in the faint forms, and the power that manifests itself in the vivid forms. (pp. 137, 138.)

And lastly, it was shown that though by the relativity of our thought we are eternally debarred from knowing or conceiving Absolute Being; yet that this very *relativity*

FIRST
PRINCIPLES

FIRST
PRINCIPLES

of our thought, necessitates that vague consciousness of Absolute Being which no mental effort can suppress. That *relation* is the universal form of thought, is thus a truth which all kinds of demonstration unite in proving. (p. 145.)

Having seen that matter is indestructible, motion continuous, and force persistent — having seen that forces perpetually undergo transformations, and that motion, following the line of least resistance, is always rhythmic, it remains to find the formula expressing the combined consequences of the laws thus separately formulated. (p. 252.)

The law we seek, therefore, must be the law of *the continuous redistribution of matter and motion*. Absolute rest and permanence do not exist. Every object, no less than the aggregate of all objects, undergoes from instant to instant some alteration of state. Gradually or quickly it is receiving motion or losing motion, while some or all of its parts are simultaneously changing their relations to one another. (p. 252.)

Our Sidereal System by its general form, by its clusters of stars of various degrees of closeness, and by its nebulae in all stages of condensation, gives grounds for suspecting that, generally and locally, concentration is going on. (p. 281.)

Evolution, under its primary aspect, is illustrated most simply and clearly by this passage of the Solar System from a diffused incoherent state to a consolidated coherent state. (p. 281.)

FIRST
PRINCIPLES

At the same time that Evolution is a change from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, it is a change from the indefinite to the definite. Along with an advance from simplicity to complexity, there is an advance from confusion to order—from undetermined arrangement to determined arrangement. Development, no matter of what kind, exhibits not only a multiplication of unlike parts, but an increase in the clearness with which these parts are marked off from one another. (p. 334.)

Proof that all Evolution is from the indefinite to the definite, we find not less abundant than proof that all Evolution is from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. (p. 350.)

The more specific idea of Evolution now reached is—a change from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity, to a definite coherent heterogeneity, accompanying the dissipation of motion and integration of matter. (p. 351.)

Here presents itself a final question, which has probably been taking shape in the minds of many while reading this chapter. “If Evolution of every kind is an increase

FIRST

PRINCIPLES

in complexity of structure and function that is incidental to the universal process of equilibration, and if equilibration must end in complete rest, what is the fate towards which all things tend? If the Solar System is slowly dissipating its energies — if the Sun is losing his heat at a rate which will tell in millions of years — if with decrease of the Sun's radiations there must go on a decrease in the activity of geologic and meteorologic processes as well as in the quantity of vegetal and animal life — if Man and Society are similarly dependent on this supply of energy which is gradually coming to an end; are we not manifestly progressing towards omnipresent death?" (p. 471.)

That such a state must be the outcome of the changes everywhere going on, seems beyond doubt. Whether any ulterior process may reverse these processes and initiate a new life, is a question to be considered hereafter. For the present it must suffice that the end of all the transformations we have traced, is quiescence. (p. 471.)

Is that motionless state called death, which ends Evolution in organic bodies, typical of the universal death in which Evolution at large must end? And have we thus to contemplate as the outcome of things, a boundless space holding here and there extinct suns, fated to remain for ever without further change. (p. 484.)

To so speculative an inquiry, none but a speculative answer is to be expected. Such answer as may be ventured, must be taken less as a positive answer than as a demurrer to the conclusion that the proximate result must be the ultimate result. If, pushing to its extreme the argument that Evolution must come to a close in complete equilibrium or rest, the reader suggests that for aught which appears to the contrary there must result a Universal Death which will continue indefinitely, two replies may be made. The first is that the evidence presented in the heavens at large implies that while of the multitudinous aggregates of matter it presents, most are passing through those stages which must end in local rest, there are others which, having barely commenced the series of changes constituting Evolution, are on the way to become theatres of life. The second reply is that when we contemplate our Sidereal System as a whole, certain of the great facts which science has established imply potential renewals of life, now in one region now in another; followed, possibly, at a period unimaginably remote by a more general renewal. This conclusion is suggested when we take into account a factor not yet mentioned. (pp. 484, 485.)

FIRST
PRINCIPLES

For hitherto we have considered only that equilibration which is taking place within our Solar System and within similar systems: taking no note of that immeasurably

FIRST
PRINCIPLES

greater equilibration which remains to take place : ending those motions through space which such systems possess. That the stars, in old times called fixed, are all in motion, has now become a familiar truth, and that they are moving with velocities ranging from say 10 miles per second up to some 70 miles per second (which last is the velocity of a "runaway star" supposed to be passing through our Sidereal System) is a truth deduced from observations by modern astronomers. To be joined with this is the fact that there are dying stars and probably dead stars. . . . The implication appears to be that beyond the luminous masses constituting the visible Sidereal System, there are non-luminous masses, perhaps fewer in number perhaps more numerous, which in common with the luminous ones are impelled by mutual gravitation. (p. 485.)

Scattered through immensurable space, but more especially in and about the region of the Milky Way, are numerous star-clusters, varying in their characters from those which are hardly distinguishable from unusually rich portions of the heavens, to those which constitute condensed swarms of stars The varieties between these extremes were regarded by Sir William Herschel as implying progressive concentration. (pp. 485, 486.)

But accepting, as we must now do, the conclusion drawn by Helmholtz . . . we are obliged to infer that stars moving at the high velocities acquired during concentration, will, by mutual arrest, be dissipated into gases of extreme tenuity, constituting what we conceive as nebulous matter. (p. 486.)

FIRST
PRINCIPLES

If in pursuance of this view we regard (1) the star-clusters variously condensed, (2) the diffused and irregular nebulæ, (3) the spiral and other nebulæ that are concentrating into star-systems, as exhibiting different stages of the same process, then the implication is that in many thousands of places throughout our Sidereal System there are going on alternations of Evolution and Dissolution. And this conception may be taken as a sufficient answer to the inference above drawn that equilibration must end in universal death—a speculative demurrer to a speculative conclusion. (p. 488.)

There are considerable difficulties in the way of regarding our Sidereal System as a whole, subject to the processes of evolution and dissolution. (p. 490.)

Nevertheless sundry traits seem to imply that throughout a past so immense that the time occupied in the evolution of a solar or stellar system becomes by comparison utterly insignificant, there has been a gathering together

FIRST
PRINCIPLES

of the matter of our Universe from a more dispersed state; and its disc-like form, or else annular form, indicated by the encircling appearance of the Milky Way, raises the thought that it has a combined motion within which all minor motions are included. Moreover the contrast between the galactic circle, with its closely packed millions of stars dotted with numerous star-clusters, and the regions about the galactic poles, in which the more regular nebulae are chiefly congregated, yields further evidence that our Sidereal System has some kind of unity, and that during an immeasurable past it has undergone transformations due to general forces. (p. 490.)

In any case, however, the irregularities of the Milky Way necessitate the conclusion that there is going on, and must continue to go on, a general change of structure. (p 490.)

Reduced to its abstract form, the argument is that the quantity of motion implied by dispersion must be as great as the quantity of motion implied by aggregation, or rather must be the same motion, taking now the molar form and now the molecular form; and if we allow ourselves to conceive this as an ultimate result there arises the conception not only of local evolutions and dissolu-

tions throughout our Sidereal System but of general evolutions and dissolutions alternating indefinitely. (p. 492.)

FIRST
PRINCIPLES

But unable though we must ever remain to give a complete account of the transformation of things, even in any of its minor parts, and still more in its totality, we are able to recognize throughout it the same general law; and may reasonably infer that it holds in those parts of the transformation which are beyond the reach of our intelligence as it does in those parts which are within its reach. (p. 493.)

The concentration of Matter implies the dissipation of Motion . . conversely, the absorption of Motion implies the diffusion of Matter. (p. 498.)

Such, in fact, we found to be the law of the entire cycle of changes passed through by every existence. Moreover we saw that besides applying to the whole history of each existence, it applies to each detail of the history. Both processes are going on at every instant; but always there is a differential result in favour of the first or the second. And every change, even though it be only a transposition of parts, inevitably advances the one process or the other. (p. 498.)

We know that while a physically-cohering aggregate like the human body is getting larger and taking on its general

FIRST
PRINCIPLES

shape, each of its organs is doing the same; that while each organ is growing and becoming unlike others, there is going on a differentiation and integration of its component tissues and vessels; and that even the components of these components are severally increasing and passing into more definitely heterogeneous structures. But we have not duly remarked that while each individual is developing, the society of which he is an insignificant unit is developing too; that while the aggregate mass forming a society is integrating and becoming more definitely heterogeneous, so, too, that total aggregate, the Earth, is continuing to integrate and differentiate; that while the Earth, which in bulk is not a millionth of the Solar System, progresses towards its more concentrated structure, the Solar System similarly progresses. (pp. 501, 502.)

So understood, Evolution becomes not one in principle only, but one in fact. There are not many metamorphoses similarly carried on, but there is a single metamorphosis universally progressing, wherever the reverse metamorphosis has not set in. In any locality, great or small, where the occupying matter acquires an appreciable individuality or distinguishableness from other matter, there Evolution goes on; or rather, the acquirement of this appreciable individuality is the commence-

ment of Evolution. And this holds regardless of the size of the aggregate, and regardless of its inclusion in other aggregates. (p. 502.)

FIRST
PRINCIPLES

While inferring that in many parts of the visible universe dissolution is following evolution, and that throughout these regions evolution will presently recommence, the question whether there is an alternation of evolution and dissolution in the totality of things is one which must be left unanswered as beyond the reach of human intelligence. (p. 506.)

If, however, we lean to the belief that what happens to the parts will eventually happen to the whole, we are led to entertain the conception of Evolutions that have filled an immeasurable past and Evolutions that will fill an immeasurable future. We can no longer contemplate the visible creation as having a definite beginning or end, or as being isolated. It becomes unified with all existence before and after; and the Force which the Universe presents, falls into the same category with its Space and Time, as admitting of no limitation in thought. (p. 506.)

Belief in a Power which transcends knowledge is that fundamental element in Religion which survives all its changes of form. This inexpugnable belief proved to be likewise that on which all exact Science is based. . . .

FIRST
PRINCIPLES

The recognition of a persistent Force, ever changing its manifestations but unchanged in quantity throughout all past time and all future time, is that which we find alone makes possible each concrete interpretation, and at last unifies all concrete interpretations. (pp. 506, 507.)


Matter, Motion, and Force are but symbols of the Unknown Reality. (p. 509.)

The reasonings contained in the foregoing pages, afford no support to either of the antagonist hypotheses respecting the ultimate nature of things. . . . Their implications are no more materialistic than they are spiritualistic; and no more spiritualistic than they are materialistic. The establishment of correlation and equivalence between the forces of the outer and the inner worlds, serves to assimilate either to the other, according as we set out with one or the other. But he who rightly interprets the doctrine contained in this work, will see that neither of them can be taken as ultimate. He will see that though the relation of subject and object renders necessary to us these antithetical conceptions of Spirit and Matter; the one is no less than the other to be regarded as but a sign of the Unknown Reality which underlies both. (p. 510.)



II

PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY





II

PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY



TRUE idea of Life must be an idea of some kind of change or changes. (Vol. I, p. 82.)

PRINCIPLES
OF BIOLOGY

Perhaps the widest and most familiar induction of Biology, is that organisms grow. (Vol. I, p. 135.)

The general truth that extra function is followed by extra growth, must be supplemented by the equally general truth, that beyond a limit, usually soon reached, very little, if any, further modification can be produced. (Vol. I, pp. 230, 231.)

Nor is this truth less clearly illustrated among the more complex mental powers. A man may have a mathematical faculty, a poetical faculty, or an oratorical faculty, which special education improves to a certain extent. But unless he is unusually endowed in one of those directions, no amount of education will make him a first-rate

PRINCIPLES
OF BIOLOGY

mathematician, a first-rate poet, or a first-rate orator. Thus the general fact appears to be that while in each individual certain changes in the proportions of parts may be caused by variations of functions, the congenital structure of each individual puts a limit to the modifiability of every part. (Vol. I, p. 231.)

A young organism arising by internal or external gemination from a parent organism, passes gradually from a state in which it is an indistinguishable part of the parent organism to a state in which it is a separate organism of like structure with the parent. At what stage does it become an individual? (Vol. I, pp. 249, 250.)

We must be content with a course which commits us to the smallest number of incongruities; and this course is, to consider as an individual any organized mass which is capable of independently carrying on that continuous adjustment of inner to outer relations which constitutes Life. (Vol. I, p. 251.)

The rise of distinct sexes was doubtless a step in evolution, and before it took place the formation of new individuals could have arisen only by division of the old, either into two or into many. (Vol. I, p. 270.)

Many problems beyond those which embryology presents have to be solved; and no solution is furnished. (Vol. I, p. 371.)

At last then we are obliged to admit that the actual organizing process transcends conception. It is not enough to say that we cannot know it; we must say that we cannot even conceive it. (Vol. I, p. 373.)

There is an *ensemble* of vital phenomena presented by each organism in the course of its growth, development, and decay; and there is an *ensemble* of vital phenomena presented by the organic world as a whole. Neither of these can be properly dealt with apart from the other. . . . What interpretation we put on the facts of structure and function in each living body, depends entirely on our conception of the mode in which living bodies in general have originated. (Vol. I, p. 415.)

We have to choose between two hypotheses—the hypothesis of Special Creation and the hypothesis of Evolution. Either the multitudinous kinds of organisms which now exist, and the far more multitudinous kinds which have existed during past geologic eras, have been from time to time separately made; or they have arisen by insensible steps, through actions such as we see habitually going on. Both hypotheses imply a Cause. The last, certainly as much as the first, recognizes this Cause as inscrutable. The point at issue is, how this inscrutable Cause has worked in the production of living forms.

PRINCIPLES
OF BIOLOGY

This point, if it is to be decided at all, is to be decided only by examination of evidence. (Vol. I, pp. 415, 416.)

Omitting the human race, whose defects and miseries the current theology professes to account for, and limiting ourselves to the lower creation, what must we think of the countless different pain-inflicting appliances and instincts with which animals are endowed? Not only now, and not only ever since men have lived, has the Earth been a scene of warfare among all sentient creatures; but palæontology shows us that from the earliest eras geologically recorded, there has been going on this universal carnage. . . . We have unmistakable proof that throughout all past time, there has been a ceaseless devouring of the weak by the strong. (Vol. I, p. 425.)

Of the animal kingdom as a whole, more than half the species are parasites. (Vol. I, p. 427.)

The inquiries of biologists have proved the falsity of the once general belief, that the germ of each organism is a minute repetition of the mature organism, differing from it only in bulk Each further advance of knowledge confirms the belief in the unity of Nature; and the discovery that evolution has gone on, or is going on, in so many departments of Nature, becomes a reason for believing that there is no department of Nature in which it does not go on. (Vol. I, pp. 432, 433.)

If a single cell, under appropriate conditions, becomes a man in the space of a few years ; there can surely be no difficulty in understanding how, under appropriate conditions, a cell may, in the course of untold millions of years, give origin to the human race. (Vol. I, p. 435.)

During general evolution it may have taken fifteen thousand years to establish, as distinct, two species differing from one another no more than the fœtus differs from itself after the lapse of an hour. (Vol. I, p. 566.)

Let us, before proceeding, consider in what particular ways this further evolution, this higher life, this greater co-ordination of actions, may be expected to show itself. (Vol. II, p. 523.)

Will it be in intelligence? Largely, no doubt. There is ample room for advance in this direction, and ample demand for it. Our lives are universally shortened by our ignorance. In attaining complete knowledge of our own natures and of the natures of surrounding things — in ascertaining the conditions of existence to which we must conform, and in discovering means of conforming to them under all variations of seasons and circumstances ; we have abundant scope for intellectual progress. (Vol. II, p. 524.)

PRINCIPLES
OF BIOLOGY


Will it be in morality, that is, in greater power of self-regulation? Largely also: perhaps most largely. Right conduct is usually come short of more from defect of will than defect of knowledge. For the right co-ordination of those complex actions which constitute human life in its civilized form, there goes not only the pre-requisite — recognition of the proper course; but the further pre-requisite — a due impulse to pursue that course. On calling to mind our daily failures to fulfil often-repeated resolutions, we shall perceive that lack of the needful desire, rather than lack of the needful insight, is the chief cause of faulty action. A further endowment of those feelings which civilization is developing in us — sentiments responding to the requirements of the social state — emotive faculties that find their gratifications in the duties devolving on us — must be acquired before the crimes, excesses, diseases, improvidences, dishonesties, and cruelties, that now so greatly diminish the duration of life, can cease. (Vol. II, pp. 524, 525.)

It does not follow that the struggle for life and the survival of the fittest must be left to work out their effects without mitigation. It is contended only that there shall not be a forcible burdening of the superior for the support of the inferior. Such aid to the inferior as the superior voluntarily yield, kept as it will be within moderate limits,

may be given with benefit to both—relief to the one, moral culture to the other. And aid willingly given (little to the least worthy and more to the most worthy) will usually be so given as not to further the increase of the unworthy. For in proportion as the emotional nature becomes more evolved, and there grows up a higher sense of parental responsibility, the begetting of children that cannot be properly reared will be universally held intolerable. . . . Hence with a higher moral nature will come a restriction on the multiplication of the inferior. (Vol. II, p. 533.)

PRINCIPLES
OF BIOLOGY





III
PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY



III

PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY

WHETHER grants that from the rudimentary consciousness implied by the vacant stare of the infant, up to the quickly-apprehensive, far-seeing, and variously-feeling consciousness of the adult, the transition is through slow steps of mental progress that accompany slow steps of bodily progress, tactilely asserts the same relation of Mind and Matter which is asserted by one who traces out the evolution of the nervous system and the accompanying evolution of intelligence, from the lowest to the highest forms of life. (Vol. I, p. 617.)

PRINCIPLES
OF PSY-
CHOLOGY

The discovery that matter, seemingly so simple, is in its ultimate structure so amazingly involved; the discovery that, while it appears to be inert, it is the seat of activities immense in quantity and complication; and the discovery that its molecules, pulsating with almost infinite rapidity, propagate their pulses into the all-surrounding ether which carries them through inconceivable distances

PRINCIPLES
OF PSY-
CHOLOGY

in infinitesimal times; serve to introduce us to the yet more marvellous discovery that molecules of each kind are specially affected by molecules of the same kind existing in the farthest regions of space. Units of sodium on which sunlight falls, beat in unison with their kindred units more than ninety millions of miles off, by which the yellow rays of the Sun are produced. Nay, even this is a totally inadequate illustration of the sympathy displayed by the matter composing the visible Universe. The elements of our Earth are thus connected by bonds of inter-dependent activity, with the elements of stars so remote that the diameter of the Earth's orbit scarcely serves as a unit of measure to express their distances. (Vol. I, pp. 619, 620.)

Carried to whatever extent, the inquiries of the psychologist do not reveal the ultimate nature of Mind; any more than do the inquiries of the chemist reveal the ultimate nature of Matter, or those of the physicist the ultimate nature of Motion. Though the chemist is gravitating towards the belief that there is a primitive atom, out of which by variously-arranged unions are formed the so-called elements, as out of these by variously-arranged unions are formed oxides, acids, and salts, and the multitudinous more complex substances; yet he knows no more than he did at first about this hypothetical prim-

itive atom. And similarly, though we have seen reason for thinking that there is a primitive unit of consciousness, that sensations of all orders are formed of such units combined in various relations, that by the compounding of these sensations and their various relations are produced perceptions and ideas, and so on up to the highest thoughts and emotions; yet this unit of consciousness remains inscrutable. (Vol. I, pp. 624, 625.)

PRINCIPLES
OF PSY-
CHOLOGY

We can think of Matter only in terms of Mind. We can think of Mind only in terms of Matter. When we have pushed our explorations of the first to the uttermost limit, we are referred to the second for a final answer; and when we have got the final answer of the second we are referred back to the first for an interpretation of it. We find the value of x in terms of y ; then we find the value of y in terms of x ; and so on we may continue for ever without coming nearer to a solution. The antithesis of subject and object, never to be transcended while consciousness lasts, renders impossible all knowledge of that Ultimate Reality in which subject and object are united. (Vol. I, p. 627.)

And this brings us to the true conclusion implied throughout the foregoing pages—the conclusion that it is one and the same Ultimate Reality which is manifested to us subjectively and objectively. (Vol. I, p. 627.)

PRINCIPLES
OF PSY-
CHOLOGY

The Law of Evolution holds of the inner world as it does of the outer world. On tracing up from its low and vague beginnings the intelligence which becomes so marvellous in the highest beings, we find that under whatever aspect contemplated, it presents a progressive transformation of like nature with the progressive transformation we trace in the Universe as a whole, no less than in each of its parts. If we study the development of the nervous system, we see it advancing in integration, in complexity, in definiteness. If we turn to its functions, we find these similarly show an ever-increasing inter-dependence, an augmentation in number and heterogeneity, and a greater precision. If we examine the relations of these functions to the actions going on in the world around, we see that the correspondence between them progresses in range and amount, becomes continually more complex and more special, and advances through differentiations and integrations like those everywhere going on. And when we observe the correlative states of consciousness, we discover that these, too, beginning as simple, vague, and incoherent, become increasingly-numerous in their kinds, are united into aggregates which are larger, more multitudinous, and more multiform, and eventually assume those finished shapes we see in scientific generalizations, where definitely-quantitative elements are co-ordinated in definitely-quantitative relations. (Vol. I, pp. 627, 628.)

IV
PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY





IV

PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY

PRIMITIVE men, who, before any arts of life were developed, necessarily lived on wild food, implying wide dispersion of small numbers, were, on the one hand, not much habituated to associated life, and were, on the other hand, habituated to that uncontrolled following of immediate desires which goes along with separateness. So that while the attractive force was small the repulsive force was great. Only as they were led into greater gregariousness by local conditions which furthered the maintenance of many persons on a small area, could there come that increase of sociality required to check unrestrained action. (Vol. I, p. 64.)

PRINCIPLES
OF
SOCIOLOGY

Before there exist in considerable degrees the sentiments which find satisfaction in the happiness of others, there exist in considerable degrees the sentiments which find satisfaction in the admiration given by others. Even

PRINCIPLES
OF
SOCIOLOGY

animals show themselves gratified by applause after achievement; and in men the gregarious life early opens and enlarges this source of pleasure. (Vol. I, pp. 64, 65.)

Great as is the vanity of the civilized, it is exceeded by that of the uncivilized. (Vol. I, p. 65.)

It is thus, too, with the regulation of conduct. The precepts of the religion of enmity are, in early stages of social development, enforced mainly by the aid of this ego-altruistic sentiment. The duty of blood-revenge is made imperative by tribal opinion. (Vol. I, p. 65.)

The habitual behaviour to women among any people, indicates with approximate truth, the *average* power of the altruistic sentiments; and the indication thus yielded tells against the character of the primitive man. (Vol. I, p. 70.)

The primitive man lacks the benevolence which adjusts conduct for the benefit of others distant in space and time, the equity which implies representation of highly complex and abstract relations among human actions, the sense of duty which curbs selfishness when there are none present to applaud. (Vol. I, pp. 73, 74.)

The conception of truth, being the conception of correspondence between Thoughts and Things, implies advance of that correspondence. (Vol. I, p. 77.)

Just as by appearance, texture, and odour, the superior animal is guided in choosing food, and swallows only things which contain much organizable matter; so the superior mind, aided by what we may figuratively call intellectual scent, passes by multitudes of unorganizable facts, but quickly detects facts full of significance, and takes them in as materials out of which cardinal truths may be elaborated. The less-developed intelligences, unable to decompose these more complex facts and assimilate their components, and having therefore no appetites for them, devour with avidity facts which are mostly valueless; and out of the vast mass absorb very little that helps to form general conceptions. Concentrated diet furnished by the experiments of the physicist, the investigations of the political economist, the analyses of the psychologist, is intolerable to them, indigestible by them; but instead, they swallow with greediness the trivial details of table-talk, the personalities of fashionable life, the garbage of the police and divorce courts; while their reading, in addition to trashy novels, includes memoirs of mediocrities, volumes of gossiping correspondence, with an occasional history, from which they carry away a few facts about battles and the doings of conspicuous men. By such minds, this kind of intellectual provender is alone available; and to feed them on a higher kind would be as impracticable as to feed a cow on meat. (Vol. I, pp. 80, 81.)

PRINCIPLES
OF
SOCIOLOGY

PRINCIPLES
OF
SOCIOLOGY

The general conclusion to which we are led is that the ideas of another world pass through stages of development. The habitat of the dead, originally conceived as coinciding with that of the living, gradually diverges—here to the adjacent forest, there to the remoter forest, and elsewhere to distant hills and mountains. The belief that the dead rejoin their ancestors, leads to further divergences, which vary according to the traditions. Stationary descendants of troglodytes think they return to a subterranean other-world, whence they emerged; while immigrant races have for their other-worlds the abodes of their fathers, to which they journey after death: over land, down a river, or across the sea, as the case may be. Societies consisting of conquerors and conquered, having separate traditions of origin, have separate other-worlds; which differentiate into superior and inferior places, in correspondence with the respective positions of the two races. . . . Finally, where the places for the departed, or for superior classes of beings, are mountain-tops, there is a transition to an abode in the heavens. (Vol. I, pp. 216, 217.)

Using the phrase ancestor-worship in its broadest sense as comprehending all worship of the dead, be they of the same blood or not, we conclude that ancestor-worship is the root of every religion. (Vol. I, p. 422.)

PRINCIPLES
OF
SOCIOLOGY

That seeming chaos of puerile assumptions and monstrous inferences, making up the vast mass of superstitious beliefs everywhere existing, thus falls into order when, instead of looking back upon it from our advanced stand-point, we look forward upon it from the stand-point of the primitive man. (Vol. I, p. 423.)

The law which is conformed to by the evolving human being, and which is consequently conformed to by the evolving human intelligence, is of necessity conformed to by all products of that intelligence. . . . Just as language, considered as an objective product, bears the impress of this subjective process; so, too, does that system of ideas concerning the nature of things, which the mind gradually elaborates. (Vol. I, p. 434.)

While *the fear of the living* becomes the root of the political control, *the fear of the dead* becomes the root of the religious control. (Vol. I, p. 437.)

Societies, like living bodies, begin as germs — originate from masses which are extremely minute in comparison with the masses some of them eventually reach. That out of small wandering hordes have arisen the largest societies, is a conclusion not to be contested. The implements of pre-historic peoples, ruder even than existing savages use, imply absence of those arts by which alone

PRINCIPLES
OF
SOCIOLOGY

great aggregations of men are made possible. Religious ceremonies that survived among ancient historic races, pointed back to a time when the progenitors of those races had flint knives, and got fire by rubbing together pieces of wood; and must have lived in such small clusters as are alone possible before the rise of agriculture. (Vol. I, p. 463.)

One who made the analogies between individual organization and social organization his special subject, might carry them further in several directions. (Vol. I, p. 588.)

He might illustrate the general truth that as fast as structure approaches completeness, modifiability diminishes and growth ends. The finished animal, moulded in all details, resists change by the sum of those forces which have evolved its parts into their respective shapes; and the finished society does the like. In either case results, at length, rigidity. (Vol. I, p. 588.)

The many facts contemplated unite in proving that social evolution forms a part of evolution at large. Like evolving aggregates in general, societies show *integration*, both by simple increase of mass and by coalescence and re-coalescence of masses. The change from *homogeneity* to *heterogeneity* is multitudinously exemplified; up from the simple tribe, alike in all its parts, to the civilized nation, full of

structural and functional unlikenesses. With progressing integration and heterogeneity goes increasing *coherence*. We see the wandering group dispersing, dividing, held together by no bonds; the tribe with parts made more coherent by subordination to a dominant man; the cluster of tribes united in a political plexus under a chief with sub-chiefs; and so on up to the civilized nation, consolidated enough to hold together for a thousand years or more. (Vol. I, p. 596.)

The marital relations, like the political relations, have gradually evolved; and there did not at first exist those ideas and feelings which among civilized nations give to marriage its sanctity. (Vol. I, pp. 615, 616.)

Let us note the marvellous parallel between the change in the structure of the social organism and a change in the structure of the individual organism. We saw that definite nucleated cells are the components which, by aggregation, lay the foundations of the higher organisms; in the same way that the well-developed simple patriarchal groups are those out of which, by composition, the higher societies are eventually evolved. Here let me add that as, in the higher individual organisms, the aggregated cells which form the embryo, and for some time retain their separate-ness, gradually give place to structures in which the cell-form is masked and almost lost; so in the social organism,

PRINCIPLES
OF
SOCIOLOGY

PRINCIPLES
OF
SOCIOLOGY

the family groups and compound family groups which were the original components, eventually lose their distinguishableness, and there arise structures formed of mingled individuals belonging to many different stocks. . . . Is there any limit to this disintegration of the family? (Vol. I, pp. 716, 717.)

Already in the more advanced nations, that process which dissolved the larger family-aggregates, dissipating the tribe . . . and leaving only the family proper, has long been completed; and already there have taken place partial disintegrations of the family proper. Along with changes which substituted individual responsibility for family responsibility in respect of offences, have gone changes which, in some degree, have absolved the family from responsibility for its members in other respects. When by Poor Laws public provision was made for children whom their parents did not or could not adequately support, society in so far assumed family-functions. . . . Legislation has of late further relaxed family-bonds by relieving parents from the care of their children's minds, and replacing education under parental direction by education under governmental direction. . . . This recognition of the individual, rather than the family, as the social unit, has indeed now gone so far that by many the paternal duty of the State is assumed as self-evident; and criminals are called "our failures." (Vol. I, p. 717.)

The salvation of every society, as of every species, depends on the maintenance of an absolute opposition between the regime of the family and the regime of the State. (Vol. I, p. 719.)

To survive, every species of creature must fulfil two conflicting requirements. During a certain period each member must receive benefits in proportion to its incapacity. After that period, it must receive benefits in proportion to its capacity. . . . Obviously this law that the least worthy shall receive most aid, is essential as a law for the immature: the species would disappear in a generation did not parents conform to it. Now mark what is, contrariwise, the law for the mature. Here individuals gain benefits proportionate to their merits. The strong, the swift, the keen-sighted, the sagacious, profit by their respective superiorities — catch prey or escape enemies as the case may be. The less capable thrive less, and on the average of cases rear fewer offspring. The least capable disappear by failure to get food or from inability to escape. And by this process is maintained that quality of the species which enables it to survive in the struggle for existence with other species. There is thus, during mature life, a reversal of the principle that ruled during immature life. (Vol. I, pp. 719, 720.)

Clearly, with a society as with a species, survival depends on conformity to both of these antagonist prin-

PRINCIPLES
OF
SOCIOLOGY

PRINCIPLES
OF
SOCIOLOGY

ciples. Import into the family the law of the society, and let children from infancy upwards have life-sustaining supplies proportioned to their life-sustaining labours, and the society disappears forthwith by death of all its young. Import into the society the law of the family, and let the life-sustaining supplies be great in proportion as the life-sustaining labours are small, and the society decays from increase of its least worthy members and decrease of its most worthy members. It fails to hold its own in the struggle with other societies, which allow play to the natural law that prosperity shall vary as efficiency. (Vol. I, p. 721.)

Hence the necessity of maintaining this cardinal distinction between the ethics of the Family and the ethics of the State. Hence the fatal result if family disintegration goes so far that family-policy and state-policy become confused. (Vol. I, p. 721.)

However fitly in the battle of life among adults, the proportioning of rewards to merits may be tempered by private sympathy in favour of the inferior; nothing but evil can result if this proportioning is so interfered with by public arrangements, that demerit profits at the expense of merit. (Vol. I, p. 721.)

The fact . . . that even intelligent animals display a sense of proprietorship, negatives the belief propounded by some, that individual property was not recognized by primitive men. When we see the claim to exclusive possession understood by a dog, so that he fights in defence of his master's clothes if left in charge of them, it becomes impossible to suppose that even in their lowest state men were devoid of those ideas and emotions which initiate private ownership. (Vol. II, p. 538.)

But the conclusion of profoundest moment to which all lines of argument converge, is that the possibility of a high social state, political as well as general, fundamentally depends on the cessation of war. . . . From war has been gained all that it had to give. The peopling of the Earth by the more powerful and intelligent races, is a benefit in great measure achieved; and what remains to be done, calls for no other agency than the quiet pressure of a spreading industrial civilization on a barbarism which slowly dwindles. That integration of simple groups into compound ones, and of these into doubly compound ones, which war has effected, until at length great nations have been produced, is a process already carried as far as seems either practicable or desirable. Empires formed of alien peoples habitually fall to pieces when the coercive power which holds them together fails. (Vol. II, pp. 663, 664.)

PRINCIPLES
OF
SOCIOLOGY

The first part of the history of the United States is the period from the discovery of the continent by Christopher Columbus in 1492 to the establishment of the first permanent settlements. This period is characterized by the exploration of the continent by Spanish, French, and English explorers, and the establishment of the first permanent settlements by the English in 1607. The second part of the history is the period from the establishment of the first permanent settlements to the American Revolution in 1776. This period is characterized by the growth of the colonies, the struggle for independence, and the establishment of the United States as a new nation. The third part of the history is the period from the American Revolution to the present. This period is characterized by the development of the United States as a major world power, the expansion of its territory, and the growth of its population.

V

PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS





V

PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS



ONDUCT is a whole; and, in a sense, it is an organic whole — an aggregate of interdependent actions performed by an organism. (Vol. I, p. 5.)

PRINCIPLES
OF ETHICS

Complete comprehension of conduct is not to be obtained by contemplating the conduct of human beings only: we have to regard this as a part of universal conduct — conduct as exhibited by all living creatures. For evidently this comes within our definition — acts adjusted to ends. The conduct of the higher animals as compared with that of man, and the conduct of the lower animals as compared with that of the higher, mainly differ in this, that the adjustments of acts to ends are relatively simple and relatively incomplete. (Vol. I, pp. 6, 7.)

Obviously the initial adjustment of an act to an end, inseparable from the rest, must be included with them under the same general head; and obviously from this

PRINCIPLES
OF ETHICS

initial simple adjustment, having intrinsically no moral character, we pass by degrees to the most complex adjustments and to those on which moral judgments are passed. (Vol. I, p. 10.)

Conduct is distinguished from the totality of actions by excluding purposeless actions; but during evolution this distinction arises by degrees. (Vol. I, p. 10.)

Conduct which furthers race-maintenance evolves hand-in-hand with the conduct which furthers self-maintenance. (Vol. I, p. 16.)

In large measure the adjustments of acts to ends which we have been considering, are components of that "struggle for existence" carried on both between members of the same species and between members of different species; and, very generally, a successful adjustment made by one creature involves an unsuccessful adjustment made by another creature, either of the same kind or of a different kind. (Vol. I, p. 17.)

While the form of conduct is such that adjustments of acts to ends by some necessitate non-adjustments by others, there remains room for modifications which bring conduct into a form avoiding this, and so making the totality of life greater. (Vol. I, p. 18.)

Beyond so behaving that each achieves his ends without preventing others from achieving their ends, the members of a society may give mutual help in the achievement of ends. And if . . . fellow citizens can make easier for one another the adjustments of acts to ends, then their conduct assumes a still higher phase of evolution. (Vol. I, p. 19.)

Ethics has for its subject-matter, that form which universal conduct assumes during the last stages of its evolution. (Vol. I, p. 20.)

We call these articles good or bad according as they are well or ill adapted to achieve prescribed ends. (Vol. I, p. 21.)

Those doings of men which, morally considered, are indifferent, we class as good or bad according to their success or failure. (Vol. I, p. 22.)

Other things equal, conduct is right or wrong according as its special acts, well or ill adjusted to special ends, do or do not further the general end of self preservation. (Vol. I, p. 23.)

Acts are called good or bad, according as they are well or ill adjusted to ends. (Vol. I, p. 25.)

PRINCIPLES
OF ETHICS

Is there any assumption made in calling good the acts conducive to life, in self or others, and bad those which directly or indirectly tend towards death, special or general? Yes; an assumption of extreme significance has been made — an assumption underlying all moral estimates. (Vol. I, p. 26.)

The question to be definitely raised and answered before entering on any ethical discussion, is the question of late much agitated — Is life worth living? Shall we take the pessimist view? or shall we take the optimist view? or shall we, after weighing pessimistic and optimistic arguments, conclude that the balance is in favour of a qualified optimism? (Vol. I, p. 26.)

On the answer to this question depends entirely every decision concerning the goodness or badness of conduct. (Vol. I, p. 26.)

The ultimate question, therefore, is — Has evolution been a mistake; and especially that evolution which improves the adjustment of acts to ends in ascending stages of organization? If it is held that there had better not have been any animate existence at all, and that the sooner it comes to an end the better; then one set of conclusions with respect to conduct emerges. If, contrariwise, it is held that there is a balance in favour of

animate existence, and if, still further, it is held that in the future this balance may be increased; then the opposite set of conclusions emerges. (Vol. I, pp. 26, 27.)

PRINCIPLES
OF ETHICS

There is one postulate in which pessimists and optimists agree. Both their arguments assume it to be self-evident that life is good or bad, according as it does, or does not, bring a surplus of agreeable feeling. The pessimist says he condemns life because it results in more pain than pleasure. The optimist defends life in the belief that it brings more pleasure than pain. Each makes the kind of sentiency which accompanies life the test. They agree that the justification for life as a state of being, turns on this issue — whether the average consciousness rises above indifference-point into pleasurable feeling or falls below it into painful feeling. (Vol. I, pp. 27, 28.)

There is no escape from the admission that in calling good the conduct which subserves life, and bad the conduct which hinders or destroys it, and in so implying that life is a blessing and not a curse, we are inevitably asserting that conduct is good or bad according as its total effects are pleasurable or painful. (Vol. I, p. 28.)

No school can avoid taking for the ultimate moral aim a desirable state of feeling called by whatever name —

PRINCIPLES
OF ETHICS

gratification, enjoyment, happiness. Pleasure somewhere, at some time, to some being or beings, is an inexpugnable element of the conception. It is as much a necessary form of moral intuition as space is a necessary form of intellectual intuition. (Vol. I, p. 46.)

The conception of natural causation is so imperfectly developed, that there is only an indistinct consciousness that throughout the whole of human conduct, necessary relations of causes and effects prevail; and that from them are ultimately derived all moral rules, however much these may be proximately derived from moral intuitions. (Vol. I. p. 56.)

A preparation in the simpler sciences is pre-supposed. Ethics has a physical aspect; since it treats of human activities which, in common with all expenditures of energy, conform to the law of the persistence of energy: moral principles must conform to physical necessities. It has a biological aspect; since it concerns certain effects, inner and outer, individual and social, of the vital changes going on in the highest type of animal. It has a psychological aspect; for its subject-matter is an aggregate of actions that are prompted by feelings and guided by intelligence. And it has a sociological aspect; for these actions, some of them directly and all of them indirectly, affect associated beings. (Vol. I, pp. 62, 63.)

Undeniable as it is that another's behaviour to us is made up of movements of his body and limbs, of his facial muscles, and of his vocal apparatus; it yet seems paradoxical to say that these are the only elements of conduct really known by us, while the elements of conduct which we exclusively think of as constituting it, are not known but inferred. (Vol. I, p. 64.)

From the biological point of view then, we see that the connexions between pleasure and beneficial action and between pain and detrimental action, which arose when sentient existence began, and have continued among animate creatures up to man, are generally displayed in him also throughout the lower and more completely-organized part of his nature; and must be more and more fully displayed throughout the higher part of his nature, as fast as his adaptation to the conditions of social life increases. (Vol. I, p. 87.)

In the normal order, pleasures, great and small, are stimulants to the processes by which life is maintained. (Vol. I, p. 89.)

Every power, bodily and mental, is increased by "good spirits;" which is our name for a general emotional satisfaction. . . . In brief, as every medical man knows, there is no such tonic as happiness. (Vol. I, pp. 90, 91.)

PRINCIPLES
OF ETHICS

While there is a benefit to be presently felt by the whole organism from the due performance of each function, there is an immediate benefit from the exaltation of its functions at large caused by the accompanying pleasure; and from pains, whether of excess or defect, there also come these double effects, immediate and remote. (Vol. I, p. 91.)

Non-recognition of these general truths vitiates moral speculation at large. From the estimate of right and wrong habitually framed, these physiological effects wrought on the actor by his feelings are entirely omitted. It is tacitly assumed that pleasures and pains have no reactions on the body of the recipient, affecting his fitness for the duties of life. The only reactions recognized are those on character; respecting which the current supposition is, that acceptance of pleasures is detrimental and submission to pains beneficial. The notion, remotely descended from the ghost-theory of the savage, that mind and body are independent, has, among its various implications, this belief that states of consciousness are in no wise related to bodily states. "You have had your gratification—it is past; and you are as you were before," says the moralist to one. And to another he says, "You have borne the suffering—it is over; and there the matter ends." Both statements are false. Leaving out of view indirect results, the direct results are that the one has

moved a step away from death and the other has moved a step towards death. (Vol. I, pp. 91, 92.)

PRINCIPLES
OF ETHICS

Led by the tacit assumption, common to Pagan stoics and Christian ascetics, that we are so diabolically organized that pleasures are injurious and pains beneficial, people on all sides yield examples of lives blasted by persisting in actions against which their sensations rebel. (Vol. I, pp. 93, 94.)

Mind consists of feelings and the relations among feelings. By composition of the relations, and ideas of relations, intelligence arises. (Vol. I, p. 104.)

As guides, the feelings have authorities proportionate to the degrees in which they are removed by their complexity and their ideality from simple sensations and appetites. (Vol. I, p. 109.)

The general truth that pursuit of proximate satisfactions is, under one aspect, inferior to pursuit of ultimate satisfactions, has led to the belief that proximate satisfactions must not be valued. (Vol. I, p. 109.)

"Pleasant but wrong," is a phrase frequently used in a way implying that the two are naturally connected. . . . Such beliefs result from a confused apprehension of the general truth that the more compound and representative feelings are, on the average, of higher authority than the simple and presentative feelings. (Vol. I, p. 112.)

PRINCIPLES
OF ETHICS

Unquestionably the essential trait in the moral consciousness, is the control of some feeling or feelings by some other feeling or feelings. (Vol. I, p. 113.)

The simpler and less ideal feelings are consciously over-ruled by the more complex and ideal feelings; and though, at first, they are practically co-extensive and undistinguished; yet, in the course of social evidence they differentiate; and, eventually, the moral control with its accompanying conceptions and sentiments, emerges as independent. (Vol. I, p. 115.)

The earliest enacted punishments are those for insubordination and for breaches of observances which express subordination — all of them militant in origin. . . . The fact that success in war is endangered if his followers fight among themselves, forces itself on the attention of the ruler. He has a strong motive for restraining quarrels, and therefore for preventing the aggressions which cause quarrels; and as his power becomes greater he forbids the aggressions and inflicts punishments for disobedience. Presently, political restraints of this class, like those of the preceding class, are enforced by religious restraints. The sagacious chief, succeeding in war partly because he thus enforces order among his followers, leaves behind him a tradition of the commands he habitually gave. Dread of his ghost tends to produce regard for these

commands; and they eventually acquire sacredness. With further social evolution come, in like manner, further interdicts, checking aggressions of less serious kinds; until eventually there grows up a body of civil laws. (Vol. I, pp. 116-118.)

The check is not a mental representation of the evil consequences which the forbidden act will, in the nature of things, cause; but it is a mental representation of the factitious evil consequences. Down to our own time we trace in legal phrases, the original doctrine that the aggression of one citizen on another is wrong, and will be punished, not so much because of the injury done him, as because of the implied disregard of the king's will. (Vol. I, p. 118.)

Moralists of one class derive moral rules from the commands of a supreme political power. Those of another class recognize no other origin for them than the revealed divine will. And though men who take social prescription for their guide do not formulate their doctrine, yet the belief, frequently betrayed, that conduct which society permits is not blameworthy, implies that there are those who think right and wrong can be made such by public opinion. (Vol. I, p. 119.)

The moral motive differs from the motives it is associated with in this, that instead of being constituted by

PRINCIPLES
OF ETHICS

representations of incidental, collateral, non-necessary consequences of acts, it is constituted by representations of consequences which the acts naturally produce. These representations are not all distinct, though some of such are usually present; but they form an assemblage of indistinct representations accumulated by experience of the results of like acts in the life of the individual, superposed on a still more indistinct but voluminous consciousness due to the inherited effects of such experiences in progenitors: forming a feeling that is at once massive and vague. (Vol. I, p. 121.)

The pleasures of pursuit are much more those derived from the efficient use of means than those derived from the end itself. (Vol. I, p. 158.)

We are shown by dogs that when no creature is caught there is still a gratification in the act of catching. The eagerness with which a dog runs after stones, or dances and barks in anticipation of jumping into the water after a stick, proves that apart from the satisfaction of appetite, and apart even from the satisfaction of killing prey, there is a satisfaction in the successful pursuit of a moving object. Throughout, then, we see that the pleasure attendant on the use of means to achieve an end, itself becomes an end. (Vol. I, p. 159.)

The doctrine that perfection or excellence of nature should be the object of pursuit, is in one sense true ; for it tacitly recognizes that ideal form of being which the highest life implies, and to which Evolution tends. There is a truth, also, in the doctrine that virtue must be the aim ; for this is another form of the doctrine that the aim must be to fulfil the conditions to achievement of the highest life. That the intuitions of a moral faculty should guide our conduct, is a proposition in which a truth is contained ; for these intuitions are the slowly organized results of experiences received by the race while living in presence of these conditions. And that happiness is the supreme end is beyond question true ; for this is the concomitant of that highest life which every theory of moral guidance has distinctly or vaguely in view. (Vol. I, pp. 171, 172.)

Not only men of different races, but also different men of the same race, and even the same men at different periods of life, have different standards of happiness. (Vol. I, p. 174.)

When we have got rid of the tendency to think that certain modes of activity are necessarily pleasurable because they give us pleasure, and that other modes which do not please us are necessarily unpleasing ; we shall see that the re-moulding of human nature into fitness for the

PRINCIPLES
OF ETHICS

requirements of social life, must eventually make all needful activities pleasurable, while it makes displeasurable all activities at variance with these requirements. . . . We shall infer that along with decrease of those emotions for which the social state affords little or no scope, and increase of those which it persistently exercises, the things now done with dislike from a sense of obligation will be done with immediate liking, and the things desisted from as a matter of duty will be desisted from because they are repugnant. (Vol. I, pp. 183, 184.)

The power of continued application which in the primitive man is very small, has among ourselves become considerable. (Vol. I, p. 184.)

Activities appropriate to their needs which give pleasures to savages have ceased to be pleasurable to many of the civilized ; while the civilized have acquired capacities for other appropriate activities and accompanying pleasures which savages had no capacities for. (Vol. I, p. 185.)

One who, leaving behind both primitive dogmas and primitive ways of looking at things, has, while accepting scientific conclusions acquired those habits of thought which science generates, will regard the conclusion above drawn as inevitable. He will find it impossible to believe that the processes which have heretofore so moulded all

beings to the requirements of their lives that they get satisfactions in fulfilling them, will not hereafter continue so moulding them. (Vol. I, pp. 185, 186.)

Ethics has to recognize the truth, recognized in unethical thought, that egoism comes before altruism. (Vol. I, p. 187.)

Throughout past eras, the life, vast in amount and varied in kind, which has overspread the Earth, has progressed in subordination to the law that every individual shall gain by whatever aptitude it has for fulfilling the conditions to its existence. . . . The law that each creature shall take the benefits and the evils of its own nature, be they those derived from ancestry or those due to self-produced modifications, has been the law under which life has evolved thus far ; and it must continue to be the law however much further life may evolve. (Vol. I, pp. 188, 189.)

Any arrangements which in a considerable degree prevent superiority from profiting by the rewards of superiority, or shield inferiority from the evils it entails—any arrangements which tend to make it as well to be inferior as to be superior ; are arrangements diametrically opposed to the progress of organization and the reaching of a higher life. (Vol. I, p. 189.)

PRINCIPLES
OF ETHICS

PRINCIPLES
OF ETHICS

Incapacity of every kind and of whatever degree, causes unhappiness directly and indirectly — directly by the pain consequent on the over-taxing of inadequate faculty, and indirectly by the non-fulfilment, or imperfect fulfilment, of certain conditions to welfare. Conversely, capacity of every kind sufficient for the requirement, conduces to happiness immediately and remotely — immediately by the pleasure accompanying the normal exercise of each power that is up to its work, and remotely by the pleasures which are furthered by the ends achieved. (Vol. I, p. 189.)

The mentally-inferior individual of any race suffers negative and positive miseries ; while the mentally-superior individual receives negative and positive gratifications. (Vol. I, p. 190.)

The conclusion forced on us is that the pursuit of individual happiness within those limits prescribed by social conditions, is the first requisite to the attainment of the greatest general happiness. (Vol. I, p. 190.)

Undue altruism increases egoism ; both directly in contemporaries and indirectly in posterity. (Vol. I, p. 198.)

A rational egoism, so far from implying a more egoistic human nature, is consistent with a human nature that is less egoistic. (Vol. I, p. 199.)

Asserting the due claims of self, is, by implication, drawing a limit beyond which the claims are undue; and is, by consequence, bringing into greater clearness the claims of others. (Vol. I, p. 200.)

As now carried on, life hourly sets the claims of present self against the claims of future self, and hourly brings individual interests face to face with the interests of other individuals, taken singly or as associated. In many of such cases the decisions can be nothing more than compromises; and ethical science, here necessarily empirical, can do no more than aid in making compromises that are the least objectionable. (Vol. I, p. 284.)

Justice, which formulates the range of conduct and limitations to conduct hence arising, is at once the most important division of Ethics and the division which admits of the greatest definiteness. (Vol. I, pp. 284, 285.)

The maxim commonly supposed to be especially Christian, but which, as we have seen, was in kindred forms enunciated among various peoples in pre-Christian days, shows us this. "Do unto others as ye would that they should do unto you," is an injunction which merges generosity and justice in one. In the first place, it makes no distinction between that which you are called upon to

PRINCIPLES
OF ETHICS

do to another on grounds of equity, and that which you are called upon to do to him on grounds of kindness; and, in the second place, it includes no recognition, overt or tacit, of those claims of the doer which we call "rights." In the consciousness of justice properly so-called, there is included an egoistic as well as an altruistic element — a consciousness of the claim of self and a sympathetic consciousness of the claims of others. (Vol. I, p. 377.)



VI
MISCELLANEOUS WORKS





VI

ESSAYS

THE AMERICANS



MANIFESTLY, those who framed your ESSAYS Constitution never dreamed that twenty thousand citizens would go to the poll led by a "boss." (Vol. III, p. 474.)

Then you think that Republican institutions are a failure? (Vol. III, p. 474.)

By no means: I imply no such conclusion. . . . The Americans got their form of government by a happy accident, not by normal progress, and they would have to go back before they could go forward. (Vol. III, p. 474.)

The current theory is that if the young are taught what is right, and the reasons why it is right, they will do what is right when they grow up. But considering what religious teachers have been doing these two thousand

ESSAYS

years, it seems to me that all history is against the conclusion. . . . Personal interests will sway the men in the ranks, as they sway the men above them; and the education which fails to make the last consult public good rather than private good, will fail to make the first do it. The benefits of political purity are so general and remote, and the profit to each individual is so inconspicuous, that the common citizen, educate him as you like, will habitually occupy himself with his personal affairs, and hold it not worth his while to fight against each abuse as soon as it appears. Not lack of information, but lack of certain moral sentiment, is the root of the evil. (Vol. III, p. 476.)

You mean that people have not a sufficient sense of public duty? (Vol. III, p. 476.)

Probably it will surprise you if I say the American has not, I think, a sufficiently quick sense of his own claims, and, at the same time, as a necessary consequence, not a sufficiently quick sense of the claims of others—for the two traits are organically related. I observe that they tolerate various small interferences and dictations which Englishmen are prone to resist. (Vol. III, p. 476.)

As Hamlet says, there is such a thing as “greatly to find quarrel in a straw,” when the straw implies a principle. If, as you say of the American, he pauses to con-

sider whether he can afford the time and trouble—whether it will pay, corruption is sure to creep in. . . . As one of your early statesmen said — “The price of liberty is eternal vigilance.” But it is far less against foreign aggressions upon national liberty that this vigilance is required, than against the insidious growth of domestic interferences with personal liberty. (Vol. III, p. 477.)

ESSAYS

The trait I refer to comes out in various ways, small and great. It is shown by the disrespectful manner in which individuals are dealt with in your journals—the placarding of public men in sensational headings, the dragging of private people and their affairs into print. There seems to be a notion that the public have a right to intrude on private life as far as they like; and this I take to be a kind of moral trespassing. . . . Free institutions can be properly worked only by men, each of whom is jealous of his own rights, and also sympathetically jealous of the rights of others—who will neither himself aggress on his neighbours in small things or great, nor tolerate aggression on them by others. The Republican form of government is the highest form of government; but because of this it requires the highest type of human nature—a type nowhere at present existing. (Vol. III, pp. 478, 479.)

ESSAYS

It may, I think, be concluded that, both because of its size and the heterogeneity of its components, the American nation will be a long time in evolving its ultimate form, but that its ultimate form will be high. One great result is, I think, tolerably clear. From biological truths it is to be inferred that the eventual mixture of the allied varieties of the Aryan race forming the population, will produce a finer type of man than has hitherto existed ; and a type of man more plastic, more adaptable, more capable of undergoing the modifications needful for complete social life. I think that whatever difficulties they may have to surmount, and whatever tribulations they may have to pass through, the Americans may reasonably look forward to a time when they will have produced a civilization grander than any the world has known. (Vol. III, p. 480.)

SOCIAL STATICS

THE MORAL-SENSE DOCTRINE



AD we no other inducement to eat than SOCIAL
that arising from the prospect of certain STATICS
advantages to be thereby obtained, it is
scarcely probable that our bodies would be
so well cared for as now. One can quite imagine that
were we deprived of that punctual monitor — appetite,
and left to the guidance of some reasoned code of rules,
such rules, were they never so philosophical, and the
benefits of obeying them never so obvious, would form
but a very inefficient substitute. Or, instead of that power-
ful affection by which men are led to nourish and pro-
tect their offspring, did there exist merely an abstract
opinion that it is proper or necessary to maintain the popu-
lation of the globe, it is questionable whether the annoy-
ance, anxiety, and expense, of providing for a posterity,
would not so far exceed the anticipated good, as to involve
a rapid extinction of the species. And if, in addition to
these needs of the body and of the race, all other require-
ments of our nature were similarly consigned to the sole
care of the intellect — were knowledge, property, freedom,
reputation, friends, sought only at its dictation — then

SOCIAL
STATICS

would our investigations be so perpetual, our estimates so complex, our decisions so difficult, that life would be wholly occupied in the collection of evidence and the balancing of probabilities. (p. 15.)

Quite different, however, is the method of nature. Answering to each of the actions which it is requisite for us to perform, we find in ourselves some prompter called a desire; and the more essential the action, the more powerful is the impulse to its performance, and the more intense the gratification derived therefrom. Thus, the longings for food, for sleep, for warmth, are irresistible; and quite independent of foreseen advantages. The continuance of the race is secured by others equally strong, whose dictates are followed, not in obedience to reason, but often in defiance of it. (p. 16.)

May we not then reasonably expect to find kindred instrumentalities prompting the conduct called moral? All must admit that we are guided to our bodily welfare by instincts; that from instincts also, spring those domestic relationships by which other important objects are compassed; and that certain prompters called sentiments secure our indirect benefit, by regulating social intercourse. Is it not then probable that a like mental mechanism is at work throughout; and that upright conduct in each being necessary to the happiness of all, there exists in us an

impulse towards such conduct; or, in other words, that we possess a "Moral Sense?" (p. 16.)

SOCIAL
STATICS

WHAT IS MORALITY

Treating, therefore, as it does on the abstract principles of right conduct, a system of pure ethics cannot recognize evil, or any of those conditions which evil generates.

To all questions which presuppose some antecedent unlawful action, such as—Should a barrister defend any one whom he believes to be guilty? Ought a man to break an oath which he has taken to do something wrong? Is it proper to publish the misconduct of our fellows?—the perfect law can give no reply, because it does not recognize the premises. In seeking to settle such points on purely ethical principles, moralists have attempted impossibilities. As well might they have tried to solve mathematically a series of problems respecting crooked lines and broken-backed curves, or to deduce from the theorems of mechanics the proper method of setting to work a dislocated machine. No conclusions can lay claim to absolute truth but such as depend upon truths which are themselves absolute. (pp. 25, 26.)

THE EVANESCENCE [? DIMINUTION] OF EVIL

All evil results from the non-adaptation of constitution to conditions. (p. 28.)

SOCIAL
STATICS

Equally true is it that evil perpetually tends to disappear. In virtue of an essential principle of life, this non-adaptation of an organism to its conditions is ever being rectified; and modification of one or both, continues until the adaptation is complete. Whatever possesses vitality, from the elementary cell up to man himself, inclusive, obeys this law. (p. 28.)

Keeping in mind these truths, that all evil results from the non-adaptation of constitution to conditions; and that where this non-adaptation exists it is continually being diminished by the changing of constitution to suit conditions; we shall be prepared for comprehending the present position of the human race. (pp. 30, 31.)

But why is not man adapted to the social state?

Simply because he yet partially retains the characteristics appropriate to an antecedent state. The respects in which he is not fitted to society, are the respects in which he is fitted for his original predatory life. His primitive circumstances required that he should sacrifice the welfare of other beings to his own; his present circumstances require that he shall not do so; and in so far as his old attribute still clings to him, he is unfit for the social state. All sins of men against one another, from the cannibalism of the Fijian to the crimes and venalities we see around us; the felonies which fill our prisons, the trickeries of

trade, the quarrellings of class with class and of nation with nation, have their causes comprehended under this generalization. (p. 31.)	SOCIAL STATICS
---	-------------------

Man needed one moral constitution to fit him for his original state; he needs another to fit him for his present state; and he has been, is, and will long continue to be, in process of adaptation. And the belief in human perfectibility merely amounts to the belief that, in virtue of this process, man will eventually become completely suited to his mode of life. (pp. 31, 32.)

Progress, therefore, is not an accident, but a necessity. Instead of civilization being artificial it is a part of nature; all of a piece with the development of an embryo or the unfolding of a flower. The modifications mankind have undergone, and are still undergoing, result from a law underlying the whole organic creation; and provided the human race continues, and the constitution of things remains the same, those modifications must end in completeness. As surely as the tree becomes bulky when it stands alone, and slender if one of a group; as surely as a blacksmith's arm grows large, and the skin of a labourer's hand thick; as surely as the eye tends to become long-sighted in the sailor, and short-sighted in the student; as surely as a clerk acquires rapidity in writing and calculation; as surely as the musician learns to detect an error

SOCIAL
STATICS

of a semitone amidst what seems to others a very babel of sounds; as surely as a passion grows by indulgence and diminishes when restrained; as surely as a disregarded conscience becomes inert, and one that is obeyed active; as surely as there is any meaning in such terms as habit, custom, practice;—so surely must the human faculties be moulded into complete fitness for the social state; so surely must evil and immorality disappear; so surely must man become perfect. (p. 32.)

GREATEST HAPPINESS MUST BE SOUGHT *INDIRECTLY*

It is for us to ascertain the *conditions* by conforming to which greatest happiness may be attained. (p. 33.)

Man is a visible, tangible entity, having properties. In the circumstances which surround him there are unchanging necessities. Life depends on the fulfilment of certain functions; and happiness is a particular kind of life. Surely, then, if we would know how, in the midst of these circumstances, the being Man must live so as to achieve greatest happiness, we ought first to determine what the essential conditions are. . . . Only in one way can the desideratum be reached. What that one way is must depend on the fundamental necessities of our position. And if we would discover it, our first step must be to ascertain those necessities. (p. 33.)

At the head of them stands this unalterable fact — the social state. (p. 33.)

SOCIAL
STATICS

Here, then, is the first of those fixed conditions to the obtainment of greatest happiness, necessitated by the social state. It is the fulfilment of this condition which we express by the word *justice*. (p. 34.)

To compass greatest happiness, the human constitution must be such that each man may fulfil his own nature, not only without diminishing other men's spheres of activity, but without inflicting unhappiness on other men in any direct or indirect way. . . . The observance of it may be called *negative beneficence*. (p. 34.)

To the primary requisite that each shall be able to get complete happiness without diminishing the happiness of the rest, we must now add the secondary one that each shall be capable of receiving happiness from the happiness of the rest. Compliance with this requisite implies *positive beneficence*. (p. 35.)

Lastly, there must go to the production of the greatest happiness the further condition, that, whilst duly regardful of the preceding limitations, each individual shall perform all those acts required to fill up the measure of his own private happiness. (p. 35.)

SOCIAL
STATICS

These then are necessities. They are not matters of opinion, but matters of fact. Denial of them is impossible, for nothing else can be stated but what is self-contradictory. . . . Everything must be good or bad, right or wrong, in virtue of its accordance or discordance with them. Our whole code of duty is comprehended in the endeavour to live up to these necessities. If we find pleasure in doing this it is well; if not, our aim must be to acquire that pleasure. . . . Hence it is for us to habituate ourselves to fulfil these requirements as fast as we can. The social state is a necessity. The conditions to greatest happiness under that state are fixed. Our characters are the only things not fixed. They, then, must be moulded into fitness for the conditions. And all moral teaching and discipline must have for its object to hasten this process. (p. 35.)

SECONDARY DERIVATION OF A FIRST PRINCIPLE

This so solid-looking principle of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," needs but to have a light brought near it, and lo! it explodes into the astounding assertion, that all men have equal rights to happiness (p. 18)—an assertion far more sweeping and revolutionary than any of those which are assailed with so much scorn. (p. 54.)

FIRST PRINCIPLE

SOCIAL
STATICS

Thus are we brought by several routes to the same conclusion. Whether we reason our way from those fixed conditions under which alone greatest happiness can be realized — whether we draw our inferences from man's constitution, considering him as a congeries of faculties — or whether we listen to the monitions of a certain mental agency, which seems to have the function of guiding us in this matter; we are alike taught, as the law of right social relationships, that — *Every man has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man.* (p. 55.)

SOCIALISM

Our first principle requires, not that all shall have like shares of the things which minister to the gratification of the faculties, but that all shall have like freedoms to pursue those things — shall have like scope. It is one thing to give to each an opportunity of acquiring the objects he desires; it is another, and quite a different thing, to give the objects themselves, no matter whether due endeavour has or has not been made to obtain them. (pp. 65, 66.)

If, therefore, out of many starting with like fields of activity, one obtains, by his greater strength, greater

SOCIAL
STATICS

ingenuity, or greater application, more gratifications and sources of gratification than the rest, and does this without trenching upon the equal freedoms of the rest, the moral law assigns him an exclusive right to all those extra gratifications and sources of gratification; nor can the rest take them from him without claiming for themselves greater liberty of action than he claims, and thereby violating that law. Whence it follows, that an equal apportionment of the fruits of the earth among all, is not consistent with pure justice. (p. 66.)

If, as M. Proudhon asserts, "all property is robbery" — if no one can equitably become the exclusive possessor of any article, or, as we say, obtain a right to it — then, among other consequences, it follows that a man can have no right to the things he consumes for food. And if these are not his before eating them, how can they become his at all? As Locke asks, "when do they begin to be his? when he digests? or when he eats? or when he boils? or when he brings them home?" If no previous acts can make them his property, neither can any process of assimilation do it: not even absorption of them into the tissues. Wherefore, pursuing the idea, we arrive at the curious conclusion, that as the whole of his bones, muscles, skin, &c., have been thus built up from nutriment not belonging to him, a man has no property

in his own flesh and blood — has no more claim to his own limbs than he has to the limbs of another ; and has as good a right to his neighbour's body as to his own ! Did we exist after the same fashion as those compound polyps, in which a number of individuals are based upon a living trunk common to them all, such a theory would be rational enough. But until Communism can be carried to that extent, it will be best to stand by the old doctrine. (pp. 66, 67.)

SOCIAL
STATICS

THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN

Whoso urges the mental inferiority of women in bar of their claim to equal rights with men, may be met in various ways.

1. If rights are to be meted out to the two sexes in the ratio of their respective amounts of intelligence, then must the same system be acted upon in the apportionment of rights between man and man. . . .

2. In like manner it will follow that, as there are here and there women of unquestionably greater ability than the average of men, some women ought to have greater rights than some men.

3. Wherefore, instead of a certain fixed allotment of rights to all males and another to all females, the hypothesis itself involves an infinite gradation of rights, irrespective of sex entirely, and sends us once more in

SOCIAL
STATICS

search of those unattainable desiderata — a standard by which to measure capacity, and another by which to measure rights. (p. 73.)

What is it that we mean by rights? Nothing else than freedom to exercise the faculties. And what is the meaning of the assertion that woman is mentally inferior to man? Simply that her faculties are less powerful. What then does the dogma, that because woman is mentally inferior to man she has less extensive rights, amount to? Just this, — that because woman has weaker faculties than man, she ought not to have like liberty with him to exercise the faculties she *has*! (pp. 73, 74.)

Command is a blight to the affections. Whatsoever of beauty — whatsoever of poetry, there is in the passion that unites the sexes, withers up and dies in the cold atmosphere of authority. (p. 76.)

The fact that any proposed principle of conduct is at once fully practicable — requires no reformation of human nature for its complete realization — is not a proof of its truth: is proof rather of its error. (p. 77.)

Hence, whenever society shall have become civilized enough to recognize the equality of rights between the sexes — when women shall have attained to a clear perception of what is due to them, and men to a nobility

<p>of feeling which shall make them concede to women the freedom which they themselves claim — humanity will have undergone such a modification as to render an equality of rights practicable. (p. 78.)</p>	<p>SOCIAL STATICS</p>
--	---------------------------

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE

Label men how you please with titles of "upper," and "middle," and "lower," you cannot prevent them being units of the same society, acted upon by the same spirit of the age, moulded after the same type of character. The mechanical law that action and reaction are equal, has its moral analogue. The deed of one man to another tends ultimately to produce a like effect on both, be the deed good or bad. (p. 100.)

EDUCATION

EDUCATION



It has been truly remarked that, in order of time, decoration precedes dress. Among people who submit to great physical suffering that they may have themselves handsomely tattooed, extremes of temperature are borne with but little attempt at mitigation. (p. 1.)

It is not a little curious that the like relations hold with the mind. Among mental as among bodily acquisitions, the ornamental comes before the useful. Not only in times past, but almost as much in our own era, that knowledge which conduces to personal well-being has been postponed to that which brings applause. (p. 2.)

To get above some and be revered by them, and to propitiate those who are above us, is the universal struggle in which the chief energies of life are expended. By the accumulation of wealth, by style of living, by beauty of dress, by display of knowledge or intellect, each tries to subjugate others; and so aids in weaving that ramified network of restraints by which society is kept in order. It is not the savage chief only, who, in formidable war-paint, with scalps at his belt, aims to strike awe into his inferiors; it is not only the belle who, by elaborate toilet,

EDUCATION

polished manners, and numerous accomplishments, strives to "make conquests;" but the scholar, the historian, the philosopher, use their acquirements to the same end. We are none of us content with quietly unfolding our own individualities to the full in all directions; but have a restless craving to impress our individualities upon others, and in some way subordinate them. And this it is which determines the character of our education. (p. 6.)

As, throughout life, not what we are, but what we shall be thought, is the question; so in education, the question is, not the intrinsic value of knowledge, so much as its extrinsic effects on others. (p. 7.)

Before there can be a rational *curriculum*, we must settle which things it most concerns us to know; or, to use a word of Bacon's, now unfortunately obsolete—we must determine the relative value of knowledges. (p. 11.)

The general problem which comprehends every special problem is—the right ruling of conduct in all directions under all circumstances. (p. 12.)

And this being the great thing needful for us to learn, is, by consequence, the great thing which education has to teach. To prepare us for complete living is the function which education has to discharge; and the only rational mode of judging of any educational course is, to judge in what degree it discharges such function. (p. 12.)

EDUCATION

That kind of information which, in our schools, usurps the name History — the mere tissue of names and dates and dead unmeaning events — has a conventional value only: it has not the remotest bearing upon any of our actions; and is of use only for the avoidance of those unpleasant criticisms which current opinion passes upon its absence. (p. 19.)

Acquirement of every kind has two values — value as *knowledge* and value as *discipline*. (p. 19.)

Men who would blush if caught saying Iphigénia instead of Iphigenía, or would resent as an insult any imputation of ignorance respecting the fabled labours of a fabled demi-god, show not the slightest shame in confessing that they do not know where the Eustachian tubes are, what are the actions of the spinal cord, what is the normal rate of pulsation, or how the lungs are inflated. (p. 26.)

They are facts from which no conclusions can be drawn — *unorganizable* facts; and therefore facts which can be of no service in establishing principles of conduct, which is the chief use of facts. Read them, if you like, for amusement; but do not flatter yourself they are instructive. (p. 54.)

That which it really concerns us to know, is the natural history of society. We want all facts which help us to understand how a nation has grown and organized itself. (p. 54.)

Only in proportion as men obtain a certain rude, empirical knowledge of human nature, are they enabled to understand even the simplest facts of social life: as, for instance, the relation between supply and demand. (p. 57.)

Is it not, indeed, an absurd and almost a sacrilegious belief that the more a man studies Nature the less he reveres it? Think you that a drop of water, which to the vulgar eye is but a drop of water, loses anything in the eye of the physicist who knows that its elements are held together by a force which, if suddenly liberated, would produce a flash of lightning? (p. 72.)

The truth is, that those who have never entered upon scientific pursuits know not a tithe of the poetry by which they are surrounded. (p. 72.)

Sad, indeed, is it to see how men occupy themselves with trivialities, and are indifferent to the grandest phenomena — care not to understand the architecture of the Heavens, but are deeply interested in some contemptible controversy about the intrigues of Mary Queen of Scots!

EDUCATION

— are learnedly critical over a Greek ode, and pass by without a glance that grand epic written by the finger of God upon the strata of the Earth! (p. 73.)

We find that for the criticism and due appreciation of works of art, a knowledge of the constitution of things, or in other words, a knowledge of science, is requisite. And we not only find that science is the handmaid to all forms of art and poetry, but that, rightly regarded, science is itself poetic. (p. 73.)

Paraphrasing an Eastern fable, we may say that in the family of knowledges, Science is the household drudge, who, in obscurity, hides unrecognized perfections. (p. 87.)

Children should be led to make their own investigations, and to draw their own inferences. They should be *told* as little as possible, and induced to *discover* as much as possible. (p. 120.)

VARIOUS FRAGMENTS

ABILITY *VERSUS* INFORMATION

HERE is only one general criticism which I feel inclined to make upon the examination papers you have forwarded — a criticism to which I think they are open in common with examination papers at large. They are drawn up with the exclusive view of testing *acquisition* rather than *power*. I hold that the more important thing to be ascertained by an examination is not the quantity of knowledge which a man has taken in and is able to pour out again, but the ability he shows to use the knowledge he has acquired; and I think that examinations of all kinds are habitually faulty, inasmuch as they use the first test rather than the last, by which to judge of superiority. (p. 100.)

I hold that in every examination there should be a certain set of questions devised for the purpose of ascertaining what capacity for original thinking the candidate has — questions to which he will find no answer in the books that he has read, but to which answers must be elaborated by himself from reflection upon the knowledge he has acquired. (p. 100.)

VARIOUS
FRAGMENTS

FACTS AND COMMENTS

SOME REGRETS

FACTS AND
COMMENTS

OFTEN when among the Scotch mountains I have pleased myself with the thought that their sides can never be brought under the plough: here at least Nature must ever remain unsubdued. Though subordination to human wants is sometimes suggested by the faint tinklings of distant sheep-bells, or by some deer on the sky-line, yet these do not deduct from, but rather add to, the poetry of the scene. In such places one may forget for a while the prosaic aspects of civilization. (pp. 6, 7.)

I detest that conception of social progress which presents as its aim, increase of population, growth of wealth, spread of commerce. (p. 7.)

We assume that our form of social life under which, speaking generally, men toil to-day that they may gain the means of toiling to-morrow, is a satisfactory form, and profess ourselves anxious to spread it all over the world; while we speak with reprobation of the relatively easy and contented lives passed by many of the peoples we call uncivilized. But the ideal we cherish is a transitory one

— appropriate, perhaps, to a phase of human development during which the passing generations are sacrificed in the process of making easier the lives of future generations. (p. 7.)	FACTS AND COMMENTS
--	-----------------------

SPONTANEOUS REFORM

Market towns, large and small, have without forethought become places of periodic exchanges ; while exchanges of higher and larger kinds have established themselves in London, where, from hour to hour, you may feel the pulse of the world. So, too, by spontaneous co-operation has grown up that immense mercantile marine, sailing and steaming, which takes men everywhere and brings goods from all places. And no less are we indebted to the united doings of private individuals for that network of submarine telegraphs by which there is now established something like a universal consciousness. All these things are non-governmental. If we ask how arose the science which guided the development of them, we find its origin to have been non-governmental. (p. 32.)

This vast social organization, the life of which we severally aid and which makes our lives possible by satisfying our wants, is just as much a naturally-developed product as is the language by which the wants are communicated. (p. 33.)

FACTS AND
COMMENTSFEELING *VERSUS* INTELLECT

There has grown up universally an identification of mind with intelligence. Partly because the guidance of our actions by thought is so conspicuous, and partly because speech, which occupies so large a space in our lives, is a vehicle that makes thought predominant to ourselves and others, we are led to suppose that the thought-element of mind is its chief element: an element often excluding from recognition every other. Consequently, when it is said that the brain is the organ of the mind, it is assumed that the brain is chiefly if not wholly the organ of the intellect. (pp. 35, 36.)

The error is an enormous one. The chief component of mind is feeling. (p. 36.)

So that the *body* even of our thought-consciousness consists of feelings, and only the *form* constitutes what we distinguish as intelligence: there is no intelligence in a sensation of red, or of sweetness, or of hardness, or of effort, but only in certain co-ordinations of such sensations. (p. 37.)

And then comes the other great class of feelings, ignored in the current conception of mind — the emotions. (p. 37.)

And this mental element which thus upon occasion shows itself supreme, is in a sense supreme at all times; for the prevailing emotions, higher or lower, are those components of mind which determine the daily conduct, now dutiful now lax, now noble now base. That part which we ordinarily ignore when speaking of mind is its essential part. The emotions are the masters, the intellect is the servant. The guidance of our acts through perception and reason has for its end the satisfaction of feelings, which at once prompt the acts and yield the energy for performance of the acts; for all the exertions daily gone through, whether accompanied by agreeable or disagreeable feelings, are gone through that certain other feelings may be obtained or avoided. (pp. 38, 39.)

So long as it will hold together, a society wicked in the extreme may be formed of men who in keenness of intellect rank with Mephistopheles; and, conversely, though its members are stupid and unprogressive, a society may be full of happiness if its members are scrupulously regardful of one another's claims, and actively sympathetic. This proposition, though almost a truism, is little regarded. Full recognition of its truth would make men honour, much more than they do, the unobtrusively good, and think less of those whose merit is intellectual ability. There would, for example, be none of the unceasing admiration for that transcendent criminal, Napoleon.

FACTS AND
COMMENTS

FACTS AND
COMMENTS

An over-valuation of teaching is necessarily a concomitant of this erroneous interpretation of mind. Everywhere the cry is — Educate, educate, educate! Everywhere the belief is that by such culture as schools furnish, children, and therefore adults, can be moulded into the desired shapes. It is assumed that when men are taught what is right, they will do what is right — that a proposition intellectually accepted will be morally operative. And yet this conviction, contradicted by every-day experience, is at variance with an every-day axiom — the axiom that each faculty is strengthened by exercise of it — intellectual power by intellectual action, and moral power by moral action. (pp. 41, 42.)

It is true that where the feeling is already active, or the capacity for it exists, some effect may result; but where the feeling is dormant or congenitally deficient, the injunction practically does nothing: unless, indeed, it excites repugnance, as sometimes happens. It seems, however, that this unlimited faith in teaching is not to be changed by facts. Though in presence of multitudinous schools, high and low, we have the rowdies and Hooligans, the savage disturbers of meetings, the adulterators of food, the givers of bribes and receivers of corrupt commissions, the fraudulent solicitors, the bubble companies, yet the current belief continues unweakened. (p. 42.)

As implied above, this undue faith in teaching is mainly caused by the erroneous conception of mind. Were it fully understood that the emotions are the masters and the intellect the servant, it would be seen that little can be done by improving the servant while the masters remain unimproved. Improving the servant does but give the masters more power of achieving their ends. (p. 43.)

FACTS AND
COMMENTS

ESTIMATES OF MEN

Speaking broadly, we may say that the world is always wrong, more or less, in its judgments of men — errs by excess or defect. Judgments are determined less by intellectual processes than by feelings; and feelings are swayed this way or that way largely by mere personal likes and dislikes, or by the desire to express authorized opinions — to be in the fashion. (p. 79.)

After going to one extreme a reaction in course of time carries it to the other extreme, and then comes eventually a re-reaction. This is clearly observable in the case of reputations. Time was when the authority of Aristotle was supreme and unquestioned. Then came Bacon and the reform in philosophy which he initiated: the result being that the reputation of Aristotle waned and the reputation of Bacon became great. (p. 79.)

FACTS AND
COMMENTS

This rhythm is conspicuously illustrated in the case of Shakespeare, who, highly appreciated by contemporaries (as witness Ben Jonson's lines), fell afterwards into neglect, and then, during the present century, has been continually rising, until now his position is so high that criticism is practically paralyzed and societies occupy themselves with the minutiae of his sentences. (p. 80.)

The judgment of his devoted admirer Ben Jonson, who, when told that Shakespeare never blotted out a line, remarked that he would have done better to blot a thousand, is probably nearer the mark than the judgment now current, which implies the belief that everything he wrote is good. (p. 80.)

Apart from particular instances, however, the conclusion is that we ought constantly to find what are the needful modifications of current opinions — not opinions about men only but opinions about other things — by contemplating in each case the rhythm, and trying to see whereabouts in it we are: feeling sure that the opinion which prevails is never quite right, and that only after numerous actions and reactions may it settle into the rational mean. (p. 81.)

STATE-EDUCATION

We may with certainty say that intellectual culture increases the power which the emotions have of mani-

festing themselves and obtaining their satisfactions — intensifies the emotional life. Were the higher emotions stronger than the lower, this would be an advantage; or were the two balanced it would not be a disadvantage; but, unquestionably, in average human beings the lower emotions are more powerful than the higher: witness the results arising from any sudden removal of all social restraints. Hence, education, adding to the force of all the emotions, increases the relative predominance of the lower, and the restraints which the higher impose are more apt to be broken through. (pp. 90, 91.)

FACTS AND
COMMENTS

What has been said above does not imply that the working classes shall be kept in ignorance, but merely that enlightenment shall spread among them after the same manner that it has spread among the upper and middle classes: being privately aided so far as philanthropic feelings prompt; for such feelings and their results are parts of the normal educational agency, operative alike on giver and receiver. (pp. 91, 92.)

If supply and demand are allowed free play in the intellectual sphere as in the economic sphere, and no hindrance is put in the way of the naturally superior, education must have an effect widely different from that described — must conduce to social stability as well as to other benefits. For if those of the lower ranks are left

FACTS AND
COMMENTS

to get culture for their children as best they may, just as they are left to get food and clothing for them, it must follow that the children of the superior will be advantaged: the thrifty parents, the energetic, and those with a high sense of responsibility, will buy education for their children to a greater extent than will the improvident and the idle. And if character is inherited, then the average result must be that the children of the superior will prosper and increase more than the children of the inferior. There will be a multiplication of the fittest instead of a multiplication of the unfittest. (pp. 92, 93.)

ULTIMATE QUESTIONS

Old people must have many reflections in common. Doubtless one which I have now in mind is very familiar. For years past, when watching the unfolding buds in the Spring there has arisen the thought — Shall I ever again see the buds unfold? Shall I ever again be awakened at dawn by the song of the thrush? Now that the end is not likely to be long postponed, there results an increasing tendency to meditate upon ultimate questions. (p. 300.)

It is commonly supposed that those who have relinquished the creed of Christendom occupy themselves exclusively with material interests and material activities — thinking nothing of the How and the Why, of the Whence and the Whither. It may be so with some of

the uncultured, but it is certainly not so with many of the cultured. In the minds of those intimately known to me, the "riddle of existence" fills spaces far larger than the current conception fills in the minds of men in general.

After studying primitive beliefs, and finding that there is no origin for the idea of an after-life save the conclusion which the savage draws from the notion suggested by dreams, of a wandering double which comes back on awaking and which goes away for an indefinite time at death; and after contemplating the inscrutable relation between brain and consciousness, and finding that we can get no evidence of the existence of the last without the activity of the first, we seem obliged to relinquish the thought that consciousness continues after physical organization has become inactive. (pp. 300, 301.)

But it seems a strange and repugnant conclusion that with the cessation of consciousness at death, there ceases to be any knowledge of having existed. With his last breath it becomes to each the same thing as though he had never lived. (p. 301.)

And then the consciousness itself — what is it during the time that it continues? And what becomes of it when it ends? We can only infer that it is a specialized and individualized form of that Infinite and Eternal Energy which transcends both our knowledge and our

FACTS AND
COMMENTS

FACTS AND
COMMENTS

imagination; and that at death its elements lapse into the Infinite and Eternal Energy whence they were derived.

There is one aspect of the Great Enigma to which little attention seems given, but which has of late years more frequently impressed me. I refer not to the problems which all concrete existences, from suns down to microbes, present, but to those presented by the universal form under which these exist — the phenomena of Space. (pp. 301, 302.)

In youth we pass by without surprise the geometrical truths set down in our Euclids. It suffices to learn that in a right-angled triangle the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides: it is demonstrable, and that is enough. Concerning the multitudes of remarkable relations among lines and among spaces very few ever ask — Why are they so? Perhaps the question may in later years be raised, as it has been in myself, by some of the more conspicuously marvellous truths now grouped under the title of “the Geometry of Position.” Many of these are so astounding that but for the presence of ocular proof they would be incredible; and by their marvellousness, as well as by their beauty, they serve, in some minds at least, to raise the unanswerable question — How come there to exist among the parts of this seemingly-structureless vacancy we call Space, these strange relations? How does it

happen that the blank form of things presents us with truths as incomprehensible as do the things it contains?

FACTS AND
COMMENTS


Beyond the reach of our intelligence as are the mysteries of the objects known by our senses, those presented in this universal matrix are, if we may so say, still further beyond the reach of our intelligence; for whereas those of the one kind may be, and are, thought of by many as explicable on the hypothesis of Creation, and by the rest on the hypothesis of Evolution, those of the other kind cannot by either be regarded as thus explicable. Theist and Agnostic must agree in recognizing the properties of Space as inherent, eternal, uncreated — as anteceding all creation, if creation has taken place, and all evolution, if evolution has taken place. (pp. 302, 303.)

Hence, could we penetrate the mysteries of existence, there would remain still more transcendent mysteries. That which can be thought of neither as made nor evolved presents us with facts the origin of which is even more remote from conceivability than is the origin of the facts presented by visible and tangible things. It is impossible to imagine how there came to exist the marvellous space-relations referred to above. We are obliged to recognize these as having belonged to Space from all eternity. (pp. 303, 304.)

FACTS AND
COMMENTS

And then comes the thought of this universal matrix itself, anteceding alike creation or evolution, whichever be assumed, and infinitely transcending both, alike in extent and duration ; since both, if conceived at all, must be conceived as having had beginnings, while Space had no beginning. The thought of this blank form of existence which, explored in all directions as far as imagination can reach, has, beyond that, an unexplored region compared with which the part which imagination has traversed is but infinitesimal — the thought of a Space compared with which our immeasurable sidereal system dwindles to a point, is a thought too overwhelming to be dwelt upon. Of late years the consciousness that without origin or cause infinite Space has ever existed and must ever exist, produces in me a feeling from which I shrink. (p. 304.)





Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process.
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide
Treatment Date: August 2004

PreservationTechnologies

A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION

111 Thomson Park Drive
Cranberry Township, PA 16066
(724) 779-2111



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS



0 012 827 549 6